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LEGAL REMEDIES FOR
OVERURBANIZATION:
THE GHANAIAN EXPERIENCE
Robert L.* and Carolyn S. Birmingham**
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking illustrations of the frustration of primitive communities suddenly confronted with the material abundance
of Western society is the so-called "cargo cult." In parts of Melanesia it is believed that all trade goods, having been created in
the world of the dead by ancestors of indigenous populations as
gifts for their descendants, have been misappropriated by foreign
intruders. Prophets predict the arrival of cargoes of manufactured
products to be distributed to their rightful recipients and urge the
construction of wharves and airfields to accommodate the expected
ships and planes. At the height of such movements, cult members
typically suspend all traditional economic activity and prepare
feasts of welcome; in one instance they set aside a certain time each
day to "sit, dressed in their best clothes at the tables, decorated,
European fashion, with flowers in bottles, which [had] been set up
to entertain the returning spirits."'
Among the more sophisticated peoples of the world's underdeveloped regions, identical frustrations have stimulated attempts
to duplicate Western economic achievement. Without unprecedented
technological advance, however, many of these attempts will fail.
To raise the level of affluence of the present population of the earth
by the year 2010 to that now enjoyed in the United States would,
for example, require annual extraction of seventy-five times as much
iron, one hundred times as much copper, two hundred times as much
lead, and two hundred and fifty times as much tin as is currently
mined.2 While such ecological barriers appear insurmountable, development today is less often retarded by ecological constraints than
* A.B. 1960, J.D. 1963, Ph.D. 1967, University of Pittsburgh; LL.M., Harvard
Law School, 1965. Professor of Law, Indiana University.
** A.B., Indiana University, 1969. We thank the International Legal Center and
the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities for financial support
which has made this study possible. They are not responsible for the views we express.
I L. MAe, AUSTRALIA IN NEW GUINEA 64 (1948). See I. JARviE, THE REvOLUTION
IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1967); P. LAWRENCE, ROAD BELONG CARGO (1964).
2 Heilbroner, Book Review, N.Y. REv. oF Booxs, April 23, 1970, at 3.
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by limitations generated within the social structure itself. Thus
recent demographic changes in many developing nations may provide impediments to, as well as opportunities for, growth. Close scrutiny of the effects of such changes can serve to elaborate that
precarious balance of forces which may facilitate or restrict development.
In the last century the aggregate population of African cities
with at least 100,000 inhabitants has increased by a factor of more
than thirty. West Africa in particular has experienced unprecedented urban growth in recent decades: the populations of Abidjan,
Cotonou, and Dakar-the capitals respectively of the Ivory Coast,
Dahomey, and Senegal-are more than ten times what their levels
were less than fifty years ago; the Nigerian centers of Lagos and
8
Ibadan now each contain over 600,000 inhabitants. In this article
we examine the difficulties associated with urbanization in the West
African nation of Ghana, focusing primarily upon the impact of the
expanding urban constituency on economic growth and policies designed to promote that growth. While these difficulties appear particularly acute in Ghana, the findings may be applied without
substantial adjustment both in other African states and in emerging
nations elsewhere. This initial section provides background to the
Ghanaian experience through a summary of the particular pressures
which urbanization might be expected to engender.
Early studies of development presented the problem confronting emerging nations in terms of the need to accelerate the rate of
growth of per capita income by obtaining funds sufficient to maintain high levels of investment.4 More recently, growth has begun
to be supplemented as a measure of national success by the criterion
of distributive equity. The two standards frequently yield widely
inconsistent evaluations. In particular, economic equality appears
often a consequence of prosperity achieved through prior oppression
of one class by another. Economic development under capitalism
has traditionally generated extreme distributive inequalities. Low
wages encouraged production by conditioning survival of the impoverished worker on continuing maximization of his labor effort.
Conversely, a generous return to capital both augmented preexisting
concentrations of wealth and invited investment by rendering al3 J. CALDWELL, AicAw RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION: THE MOVEMENT TO GHANA'S

TowNs 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as THE MOVEMENT TO GHANA'S TOWNS]; WORLD
of
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 575, 576 (L. Long ed. 1970); Andreski, Urban Jungles
West Africa, 7 DEVELOPMENT DIGEST 74 (1969).
4 See, e.g., E. DOMAR, ESSAYS IN TEE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1957); R.
HARROD, TOwARDS A DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1948). See also Bruton, Growth Models
in Underdeveloped Economies, 63 J. PoL. EcoN. 322, 335 (1955).
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ternatives to consumption more attractive. Saving was a function of
uneven distribution: in the early stages of industrialization, rapid
growth required depriving the majority of satisfactions beyond sustenance to permit others greater incomes than they could conveniently expend.
In Africa and other parts of the developing world, economic
privilege is essentially unchanged by the egalitarian reforms now
common in less impoverished societies. Professor Dumont points
out that a deputy in Francophonic Africa typically earns as much
per month of work as the average peasant earns in twenty-four
years.' Another writer has recently asserted that in the Congo
(Leopoldville) barely 1 percent of the population receives 50 percent of the national income." Economic inequality, though, may
be inevitable in a developmental context:
Social equality appears to be a luxury only the affluent societies
can afford....

• . . The very process of highly educating a group of leaders
inevitably opens a wide gap between the privileged few and
the
masses. On purely economic grounds this large investment in education must be protected by the best medical care, housing, and food.
This bare minimum alone makes the leadership privileged, and unfortunately, in most countries the leaders have not limited themselves
to a bare minimum.7
Industrialization is considered by leaders in many emerging
nations to be the key to development." Industrialization, however,
can impede advances based on exploitation of labor in two ways.
First, a relatively highly trained and, hence, less docile work force
is an essential element in a technologically advanced society. Complex machinery is unproductive unless conjoined with skilled labor.
Moreover, as has been particularly evident in Chinese Communist
efforts to achieve technical proficiency without sacrificing ideological
purity,' to educate the worker is to provide him a perspective from
5

R. DUMONT, FALSE START IN AFRICA 81 (2d ed. P. Ott transl. 1969).
R. VERBEEx, LE CONGO EN QUESTION 129 (1965), translated in S. ANDRESKI,
THx
AFRICAN PREDICAMENT: A STUDY IN THE PATHOLOGY
OF MODERNISATION 25-26 (1968).
7 T. DE GREGORI, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRoPiCAL AFRICAN FRONTER 211 & n.78 (1969). The author
notes that many of the difficulties experienced by the Congo following independence have been
attributed to
relative deprivation of the populace compared to the new elite. id.
at 212-13 n.83.
See Young, Violence and Rebellion in the Congo, in THE CONGO, AFRICA,
AND A.SERICA
6

13 (G. Gappert & G. Thomas eds. 1965).
8 "What alchemy was to the Middle Ages, industrialization is to the under-

developed world of this century-the magic elixir that can transform
feudal societies."
P. NEHExmIS, LATIN AMERICA: MYTH AND REALy 185 (1964).
9 See, e.g., MU FU-SHENG, THE WILTING OF THE HUNDRED FLOWERS:,
THE
CHINESE INTELLIGENTSIA UNDER MAO

(1962).
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African Case, 17 EcoN. DEVELOPMNT

Analysis, 60 AM.
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329 (1968);
Unemployment in Less Developed Countries, 8 YALE EcoN. ESSAYSEcoN. Rzv. 187
60 AM.
Todaro, Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment: Reply,

in Less De(1970); Todaro, A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment
Labor Migration and

veloped Countries, 59 AM. EcoN. REV. 138 (1969); Zarembka,
184 (1970).
Urban Unemployment: Comment, 60 AM. EcoN. REv.
THE PATHOLOGY OF
12 S. ANDRESxi, THE AFRCAn PREDICAMENT: A STUDY 3N
APPICAN PREDICAE T].
MODERNISATiox 45 (1968) [hereinafter cited as THE
INTEGRATION 195-96 (1961).
13 B. BALASSA, THE THEORY op ECONOvc
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level 'of consumption, developmental efforts are generating two
additional claims on community resources. Funds are
now needed
not merely for consumption but also for investment. Furthermore,
progress toward industrialization is creating a metropolitan
proletariat of a size and awareness sufficient to enforce the demands
of its
members for a greater share of those amenities formerly
reserved
to the dominant few. The common claim that political
pressures
generated by organized urban labor compel modern manufacturing
enterprises in impoverished nations to pay relatively high
wages to
their workers, while accurate, understates the potentially
revolutionary impact of this group. Since development itself implies
increasing productivity, the development process may be viewed
as a race
between growth of output on the one side and rising class
aspirations
on the other, with the former not outpacing the latter
in many
nations. The outcome in its African context has been described
as
a war of all against all.14
Such a war is not unique to this time or to any one
area.
Perpetuation of existing distributions of wealth and power
has often
required physical restraint of unruly urban populations.
In Europe
in 1848 a mass rising occurred in every city with
more than
100,000 inhabitants;'5 Haussmann, the designer of Paris,
reputedly
established a street plan with long diagonals and systematic
cross
points and intersections to facilitate fire by agents of the
government
on revolutionary mobs. 6 The early rulers of Buganda
encountered
similar difficulties:
Although the population of the capital must have run to tens
of
thousands, there is no sign that a city mob took any part in
rebellions,
as it may have done in some West African states. This is
doubtless
because very stern measures were taken to control the population
of
the capital. Periodically, and especially at times of political dissension,
or when there were large numbers of rowdy men abroad in the
streets,
the royal executioners were sent out to ambush the streets
of the
capital and to

seize and kill all persons who could not give a good
explanation of their presence. Those arrested had
not necessarily
committed any crime: they are described as people
who had no
employment in the capital, and included innocent peasants
who were
bringing in food. . . . It is therefore not surprising that
the common
people went in fear of their lives in the streets of the
capital, and if
they had to go there hastened home again as soon as
their business
17
was completed.

14 THE AFRICAN PREDICAMENT, supra note 12,
at'49. See Myint, Trade, Education
and Economic Development, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
1, 11 (I. Stewart ed. 1969);

15 A. TAYLOR, THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 1809-1918,
at 58 (1948).
16 J. GUNTHER, TWELVE CITIES 48 n.1 (1969).
17 M. GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL
IN

well ed. 1965).

TRIBAL SocIETy 153 (B. Black-
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One function of law is to provide methods of regulation alternative to violence. In the following two sections we describe the extent
and nature of urbanization in Ghana and discuss attempts by the
government of this nation to combat problems created by demographic change through techniques which rely only indirectly on
its theoretical monopoly of physical force. The Ghanaian community
is, for clarity, divided into a rural sector, an urban proletariat, and
an elite. Peasants and workers, the bulk of the population, are
adequately characterized through statistical summary. The privileged minority may be appropriately defined in terms of education,
income, or political office, even though lack of detailed information
precludes precise specification. Such a framework is important for
analyzing the economic interrelationships between the groups and
the legal controls evoked, for freedom of the elite to establish the
policy of the government is severely limited by the responses of
other groups. In particular, expenditures for development are constrained by competing claims to present consumption.
II. GHANAIAN URBANIZATION

In 1921 only 181,000 persons or 7.9 percent of the people of
Ghana lived in centers with more than 5,000 inhabitants; in 1960
the 1,551,000 inhabitants of such centers constituted 23.1 percent
of all Ghanaians. Between 1948 and 1960 the urban population of
the country grew at an average annual rate of 9.2 percent. The
population of Accra, the capital and largest city, increased to
416,000 during this period, a gain of 181 percent. The other major
urban areas, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi, expanded slightly less
rapidly, numbering 218,000 and 123,000 residents respectively in
1960. The crude birth rate in Ghana has been estimated to be fiftytwo per thousand. Perhaps 45 percent of the population is under
fifteen years of age. In northern Ghana, both Islamic and polygynous, the desired completed family averages 13.2 children; many
persons believe thirty or more children in a family to be optimal.
While the birth rate is high, almost 60 percent of urban growth
between 1948 and 1960 was attributable to migration: 49 percent
18
of Accra residents in 1960 had been born outside the capital region.
J. CALn18 TiE MOVEMENT TO GHANA'S TowNs, supra note 3, at 11 Table 1:1;

NEW URBAN ELITE
WELL, POPULATION GROWTH AND FAMILY CHANGE IN AFRICA: THE

22
GHANA 11 (1968); Caldwell, Determinants of Rural-Urban Migration in Ghana,
Economically
POPULATION STUDIES 361 (1968); Caldwell, Fertility Attitudes in Three
217, 230
Contrasting Regions of Ghana, 15 EcoN. DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE
CONTrMIooF
ST-Dv
A
2
in
Urbanization,
and
Migration
Table 6 (1967); Caldwell,
RARY GHANA: SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 111, 129 Table 3.11, 131 Tables
eds. 1967)
3.12, 3.13, 134 Table 3.16 (W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt & E. Omaboe
General
Population:
Caldwell,
Urbanization];
and
Migration
as
cited
[hereinafter
In
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Provisional results of the 1970 census indicate that the population
of Accra has more than doubled during the past decade, reaching
840,000 persons or almost 10 percent of the national total.1"
In Ghana urban populations differ from rural populations not
only in sex ratios and age distributions but also with respect
to
educational attainments and income. Although the cities attract
both sexes, the typical migrant is the young male. In Accra,
the
number of males in 1960 between twenty-five and forty-four years
of age exceeded the number of females in the same age range
by
52 percent.2 0 Urbanization has been accelerated by what may
be
termed the "inevitability of migration of the educated."' Elementary education was made free of tuition in 1952 and at least
nominally compulsory in 1961; even in rural areas one child
of
school age in three was attending
classes as early as 1960. By the
1967-68 academic year, registration in the primary and middle
grades surpassed 1.4 million. 22 A relatively large and aware class
of urban workers has thus developed. Their pay when employed
is
arguably generous given low marginal productivity: in 1968
the
income of the fully engaged minimum wage earner approached
two
hundred dollars, falling not far short of the per capita gross national
product of almost two hundred and forty dollars.2' Unlike a member
of a classically oppressed proletariat, the urban Ghanaian can
but
does not wish to return to the land, either because his earnings
exceed what he would receive in the rural sector or because he finds
life in the city more attractive in other respects.
An American agricultural advisor is reported to have stated:
Ghana imports 80 percent of its food for its 7.7 million people....

Food is a big problem in Ghana ....

[T]he main staple is corn sup-

plemented with fruit and cassava, a fruit from which the juice has
been squeezed leaving it moist and crumbly....
[T]he only source of protein for the people are the bugs and
worms in the corn which are ground up with the kernels....

Characteristics,in 2 A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY GHANA: SOME As
PEcTS
SocI
17, 38 Table 1.8 (W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt & E. Omaboe eds. o1967).
19 Matchet's Diary, 1970 W. AP. 610, 611.
20 Migration and Urbanization, supra note 18, at 129
Table 3.11.
21 THE MOVEMENT TO GHANA's TowNs, supra note 3,
at 114.
22 TWO-YEAR

STRUCTURE

DEVELOPMENT PLAN:

FROM STABILISATION

TO DEvELOPMENT-A

PLAN FOR THE PERIOD Mm-1968 TO Mm-1970, at 81 (Ghana
1968) [hereinafter cited
as TwO-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN]; Bissue, Ghana's Seven-Year
in Retrospect, 11 GHANA EcoN. BULL. 21, 38 (1967); Migration Development Plan
and Urbanization,

supra note 18, at 129 Table 3.11, 131 Table 3.12.

23 GHANA CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, ECONOMIC
SURVEY, 1968, at 18 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as EcoNomiC SURVEY, 1968]. See C. DUODU,
R. FITCH & M. OPPENHEIMER, GHANA: END OF AN ILLuSIoN THE GAB Boys (1967);
(1966); P. FosTM, EDUCATiON AND SociL CANoz nq G NA (1965).
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a
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less, dietary deficiencies combine with inadequate sanitary precautions to create serious health hazards. There is one physician for
each 15,000 persons. If all persons were served, each of the dentists
in Ghana would be charged with the care of more than 5,000,000
teeth.26 Moreover, agricultural production is not adequate to supply internal demand at moderate prices. In 1961 outlays for imported food comprised 12.9 percent of total food expenditures.
Although this ratio fell to 5.8 percent in 1968, reduction appears
in part a consequence both of impediments to importation and of
income effects of a falling standard of living: less expensive domestic
products have been substituted for foreign luxuries. Upward pressure on prices has been substantial: in 1968 the index of urban
prices of locally produced food, using 1963 as the base year and a
base index of 100, averaged 168.5, while the proportion of consumption expenditures devoted to food rose from 47.3 percent in
1960 to 59.9 percent in 1968.27

The real wage of the urban minimum wage earner increased
32 percent between 1952 and 1960 but by 1966 had fallen 28 percent
28
product per capita has
below the 1952 level. Real gross national
2 9 Those without work have
years.
also declined over the last several
been estimated to number 600,000.30 The 1960 census reported an
unemployment rate as high as 25 percent of the wage labor force,
with job opportunities particularly infrequent for the younger
that the situaworker. Planners in 1968 asserted the improbability
l Increasing criminal
.
tion had improved in the intervening years
activity has been attributed in part to the desperation of the jobless.32 Attempts by the government to reduce private consumption
24

Koto, Report on Ghana by "The [Expert] Ugly American," Legon Observer,

Nov. 10, 1967, at 20, col. 1.
25 Id. at 20-21.
26 Prescriptionfor Ghana'sIlls, 1970 W. APR. 38.
110.
27 ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1968, supra note 23, at 23 Table 6, 108,
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28 COMMISSION
MISSION),

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE AND

REMUNERATION
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OF ENTHE PUBLIC SERVICES IN GHANA 26 (1967) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
QUIRY].
29 ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1968, supra note 23, at 18 Table 2.
80 Matchet's Diary, 1969 W. AFR. -1431.
See ECONOMIST INTEL31 Two-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 22, at 79.
GAMBIA 3 (1967);
LEONE,
SIERRA,
NIGERIA,
GMANA,
REV.:
EcoN.
Q.
UNIT,
LIGENCE

Letters to the Editor, 1970 W. APR. 314.
82 Legon Observer, Sept. 27, 1968, at 17, col. 1.
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in 1961 precipitated a "quasi-insurrectional strike" among harbor
and railway workers in Sekondi-Takoradi.18 More recently, "over a
hundred strikes, some of them violent and bloody," were counted
between February of 1966 and June of 1969.1
This statistical profile establishes a not unexpected pattern.
Per capita income is so low as to result in serious deprivation,
especially with respect to diet and health services, the most obvious
and important components of well-being in tropical regions. Discontent thus generated need not and does not lack a geographical
focus. The rapidly expanding Ghanaian population is increasingly
concentrated in a few metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the male
of working age unencumbered by a wife and children and with
enough education to reject the primitive isolation of rural life
is disproportionately represented among migrants, adding a particularly unstable element to an already politically volatile demographic
situation. Although when available even jobs offering the minimum
wage pay well by Ghanaian standards, an alarming proportion of
residents of Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi-Takoradi remain without
jobs. Increases in productivity, which might offer economic gain to
dissident groups without commitment to them of a greater proportion of the community wealth, have not been achieved. Indeed, although inflation has partly masked the change, the rate of population growth has exceeded the growth rate of real income in recent
years. Incentives in the agricultural sector have been inadequate
either to stimulate a high level of output or to stem the exodus to
metropolitan areas. In the cities food prices have risen, again increasing discontent. Continued expansion of the urban proletariat
has been restricted by national economic reversals requiring general
restraints on consumption which make migration to the cities less
attractive. Nevertheless, the power of the workers in the cities has
halted these restraints on consumption short of that level of abstinence which would permit investment on a scale sufficient to assure
renewed growth through moderate but steady economic advance.
III. REMEDIAL

EFFORTS

The state, in traditional liberal thought, supplies a framework
of order within which economic optimality is achieved through interplay of individual desires and capabilities in relatively unconstrained markets. In the developmental context, however, the role of
88 R. GENOuD, NATIONALISM AND EcONO iic DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 7, 73, 100,
178 (1969).
84 Strikes and Economic Development, Legon Observer, June 20, 1969, at 1, col.
2. See 1970 W. Aa. 719, 750.
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government is not defined by such passive accommodation of
divergent personal goals. The law, no longer usefully analogized to
the rules of a game, becomes an instrument applied by a controlling
minority, often in spite of significant internal recalcitrance, to
transform a traditional society into an approximation of modern
European nationhood. Dean Harvey has studied Ghanaian legal institutions from a perspective which defines law as "a specific technique of social ordering, deriving its essential character from its
reliance upon the prestige, authority, and ultimately the reserved
35
monopoly of force of politically organized society."1 The secular
element in his approach is stressed by Robert Seidman, also familiar
with Ghanaian conditions: "In this view, law has no moral authority
merely because it is law; rather, it embraces every aspect of state
power."3 Law-making may therefore be deemed primarily a technical function: objectives defined through political processes are to be
achieved by means which are free of ethical presuppositions.
The presence in Ghanaian cities of large numbers of young
males with few restraining familial responsibilities, frequently without work and even when employed able to earn only a declining real
wage much of which must be spent on increasingly costly products
of the agricultural sector, has posed a continuing danger of destabilization repeatedly recognized by those guiding development. The
consequent impact on Ghanaian economic policy is reflected by four
overlapping but not necessarily consistent categories of responses.
First, the government of Ghana has sought to provide employment
opportunities for the urban jobless and to maintain an acceptable
wage. Second, it has introduced incentives encouraging establishment of industry in outlying districts. Third, it has attempted to
retard migration to cities and to attract those without work from
the cities to rural areas by reducing disparities between rural and
urban standards of living and by offering inducements to agricultural
production. Finally, it has tried to increase benefits to its threatening metropolitan constituency through discriminatory expulsion or
impotent alien groups. In each instance the
restriction of relatively
"value-neutral tool" 7 of the law has been used to articulate and
implement the measures adopted. These programs have combined
to permit a tenuous control of the urban proletariat. However, the
present structure of the Ghanaian economy precludes more than
mere damping of political unrest.
85 Harvey, The Challenge of the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REv. 603, 605 (1961).
See W. HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA (1966).

86 Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking,

Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 999.
87 Id.
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A. Urban Income and Employment
The government of Ghana exercises control over the living
standards of the urban worker in two ways: it not only determines
the minimum wage paid by employers in the industrial and service
sectors of the economy, but also as a substantial employer is able
by its hiring and layoff practices to affect significantly metropolitan
rates of unemployment. In the past decade both aspects of this
bipartite authority have served important functions. By establishing
a low minimum wage, the government can both free resources for
other projects and discourage migration to metropolitan areas.
Funds thus made available may be used to accelerate growth or
to improve rural living conditions. Either purpose can be expected
to lessen that instability which is the primary danger of rapid
urbanization, the former by facilitating satisfaction of new demands
by city workers and the latter by further reducing the rate of migration. Since a high minimum wage conversely limits the dangers of
immediate urban unrest but may restrict growth and attract additional migrants, the wage rate at a given time should depend in part
on both the level of insecurity of the government at that time and
the rate at which it discounts future insecurity. The extent to which
public employment is expanded may similarly be determined by
balancing present against prospective insecurity. In both instances
current exigencies in Ghana have prevented adoption of policies
seeking distant gains.
In 1967 in Ghana 356,100 wage earners worked in establishments employing more than ten persons; of these workers, 256,400
were engaged by the public sector, while 99,700 worked for private
firms.8 8 The scope of public employment has permitted substantial
reduction in the numbers of urban jobless during certain periods
through expansion of the state labor force. A 1967 report accepted
as only a slight exaggeration the observation that, for significant
numbers of workers, public employment had become a system of
poorly disguised public relief. 9 The Workers Brigade, established
in 1961 to train the jobless, reached a strength of 28,000 persons,
many of whom were little more than permanent unproductive sal88 ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1968, supra note 23, at 103 Table
65. The basic monetary
unit of Ghana, the cedi, comprising one hundred pesewas, is worth ninety-eight
cents.

The lowest permissible wage, forty-five pesewas per day in 1952, was raised
from
sixty-five to seventy pesewas per day in 1967 and further increased to seventy-five
pesewas per day in 1968. Inflationary pressures have precluded concomitant advances
in real income. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra; COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY,
supra note 28, at 26; Legon Observer, July 21, 1967, at 22; Legon Observer, May
24,
1968, at 16.
89 COaMISSION OF ENQUIRY, supra note 28, at 28.

1970]

OVERURBANIZATION

aried employees in what amounted to a paramilitary organization. °
The State Farms Corporation, the result of largely abortive efforts
to expand the public sector to include agricultural enterprise, similarly is said to have absorbed a very substantial component of
surplus labor." In 1966 perhaps 50,000 state employees were dismissed when efforts to economize were initiated; nevertheless the
ability to generate employment remains an important aspect of
government undertakings.4
B. Dispersion of Industry
Professor Arthur Lewis, an early mentor of Ghanaian economic
policy, asserted:
It is much easier to create the framework required for industrialisation
if factories are together than if they are scattered all over the place.
There is always some ,demand that new factories should be sited all
over the country, and even in the heart of the countryside, so that
everyone may have an equal chance of industrial employment. Such a
demand simply fails to take account of the substantial economies of
industrial concentration, economies whose appeal is to be seen in the
fact that it is usually the largest industrial concentrations that grow
fastest . . . . In countries where manufacturing is just starting, it is
best to make the most of advantages of concentration, and to leave the
dispersal of industry to a later stage when manufacturing is a well
established and rapidly growing activity.4"

Although at some point in the unregulated development process the
losses from additional concentration will begin to outweigh the
gains, Professor Lewis' argument correctly characterizes the economic advantages of concentration during the early stages of
growth. It nevertheless improperly disregards the political consequences of such an economic policy, for when workers are gathered
together they have an increased ability to enforce demands. The
satisfaction of those demands not only further reduces the likelihood
of investment and concomitant gains in productivity but also serves
40 GHANA MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEE

Or THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL 11 (1966).

41 A. Seidman, Ghana's Development Experience 1951-1965, June 1968, at 299 (unpublished dissertation in University of Wisconsin Library). In 1966 its 16,400 employees
cultivated 35,300 acres. By 1968 the number of workers had been reduced to 5,382;
although cultivated acreage declined by almost 30 percent, acres farmed per worker
increased from 2.2 to 4.9. Due, Agricultural Development in the Ivory Coast and
Ghana in the 1960's, at 15 (1969, unpublished).
42 A. Seidman, supra note 41, at 344; GHANA MINISTRY Or TRADE, HANDBOOK Or
COMERCE AND INDUSTRY 40-48 (1968); Bloom, Cautious Path to a Restored Economy, Financial Times (London), Feb. 24, 1969, at 12, cols. 5, 6; Reprieve for
Workers' Brigade, 1968 W. AFR. 1129; 1970 W. Ara. 302.
48 W. LEwIs, REPORT ON INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE GOLD COAST 18 (1953).
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as a stimulus to accelerated migration. Following the teachings of
Professor Lewis and others holding similar views, manufacturing
activity in Ghana is heavily concentrated in the cities, particularly
in Accra and adjacent Tema. 4
Attempts to locate industry in less densely populated regions,
as yet largely unsuccessful, have been stimulated by increasing
awareness of the dangers of concentration.4 5 In 1965 the government
sought "to check the drift of population from the rural areas to
the urban centres in search of employment and to utilize to the
fullest possible extent local raw materials which are obtained in
the rural areas" 46 by directing establishment of fifteen small factories in outlying districts. The effort failed; two years later those
facilities which had been constructed remained for the most part
unused.17 The state tomato canning plant at Pwalugu, completed
in 1966, represents another attempt by the government to decentralize industry. It too, however, has achieved very little. Regional
tomato production in 1966 totalled 9,000 tons, less than 40 percent
of the input required for processing efficiency. The crop, moreover,
can be sold for consumption while fresh for twelve pesewas per
pound, more than twice the maximum price of five pesewas per
pound offered by the factory."
More recent concern with undesirable concentration has motivated plans to induce private enterprise to locate in outlying districts. Firms in selected new industries will be given preferential
access to tax relief and other benefits under the Capital Investments Act of 1963.49 Firms not qualifying for such treatment may
obtain a reduction of 20 percent in the rate of corporate income tax,
authority to carry losses forward three years, remission of 50 percent of excise duties and sales taxes, an investment allowance of 5
percent, and exemption from excess profits taxes. Opportunities to
purchase power and water and to rent land owned by the govern44 A. Seidman, supra note 41, at 36-38, 41-42.
45 See text accompanying notes 13-34 supra.

46 GHANA CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1965, at 75 (1966).

See Trade Surplus for Ghana, 1969 W. AYR. 249.

47 GHANA CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1967, at 77 (1968).

48 Sorting Out the Legacy, 1968 W. AFR. 801; Thorn, The Vea Tragedy, Legon
Observer, Sept. 13, 1968, at 17, 18. Nonoperation is nevertheless itself an economic
triumph of sorts: tomato puree is imported in drums at little expense, while factory
production, geared to small cans, would entail importation of substantial quantities
of tinplate.
49 The Act is otherwise primarily designed to attract foreign capital without
locational restrictions. Act 172, April 19, 1963, 3 Acts of Ghana. See U.N. ECONOMIC
COMM'N FOR AFRICA, INVESTMENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN AFRICA 36, U.N.
Doc. E/CN. 14/INR/28/REV.2 (1965).
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ment at reduced rates are also to be available to all nonurban
plants. 50
C. Rural Development
Traditionally, the government of Ghana has not only given
priority to industrial development but has also financed this development from agricultural earnings. In 1968 cocoa and cocoa products comprised 65.7 percent of Ghanaian exports. The 1969 price
to producers of eight cedis per sixty-pound load, set by the Cocoa
Marketing Board, a state corporation, was approximately one third
of the world marketprice. Receipts from cocoa export taxes currently account for about one third of recurrent government revenues; profits from purchases and sales by the Cocoa Marketing
Board are also added to government coffers. 5' Return to the cocoa
farmer from additional investment of capital and labor is substantially, below the value of such investment to the economy. As a
result, Ghanaians have neither adequately tended existing cocoa
trees nor achieved an acceptable rate of growth of output by cultivating additional acreage. A high producer price could be expected
to increase foreign exchange earnings and might reduce the high
rate of migration of young people from the land. Such consequences,
though, must be balanced against an immediate loss of income to
the government and concomitant disruptive increases in private
spending power. While cocoa producers are not without political
strength, their recent relative quiescence has dictated a compromise
which again values current stability over long-range gains.
Planners nevertheless currently purport to accord agricultural
development "the highest priority . . . consistent with sound economic operation," recognizing the value of this policy "as a means
of reducing disparities of income and of slowing down the drift to
the towns." 52 The present cocoa producer price, although still a
small proportion of an increased world price, is substantially above
the 1965 producer price of less than four cedis.5 3 Moreover, agricul50 A. AFRIFA, BUDGET STATEMENT FOR 1968-69, at 16 (1968); Ghana's Industrial
Policy, BusINEss WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 1969, at 2, cols. 3, 5, at 5, col. 1.
51 EcoNomic SuRVEY, 1968, supra note 23, at 45, 68, 69 (1969) ; Cocoa Farmers'
Price Protest, 1969 W. AFR. 1*155; Focus on Farmers, 1969 W. Apa. 825; Matchet's
Diary, 1969 W. ArR. 583, 583-84, See R. SZEPESZEWSKI, STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE
ECONOMY OF GHANA, 1891-1911 (1965); F. WEYmAR,,THE DYNAMacs OF THE WORLD
COCOA MARKET (1968).
52 TWO-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 22, at 3.
53 In 1968 the Cocoa Marketing Board guaranteed a minimum price of six cedis
for the following three years; for 1968-69 minimum prices of 4.50 cedis per 220 pound
bag of maize and 6.20 cedis per 180 pound bag of rice were also assured. A. AniFA,
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tural enterprises have been granted exemption from income taxation
during their first five years of operation. The government has also
undertaken repair and expansion of the road network, historically
an important stimulus to production of cash crops because animal
diseases make human portage the sole substitute for motorized
transport. A program to improve the quality of rural life contemplates extensive electrification and provision of potable water supplies. Other measures appear less usual:
[The government is] proposing . . . to spread farming more widely
among the better-educated and the better-paid members of the community who live in the urban areas, many of them as workers in the
government service. We would like members of the government, civil
servants, teachers, trade unionists, traders and industrial workersindeed, everybody, who has some time to spare, the willingness to
f, learn, and a little money to invest-to establish their own farms or at
least their own garden plots. It is our hope that within a few years
it will become established practice for the members of the urban
middle class to have a personal stake in our agricultural economy. We
hope that our successors in office will not only confirm this policy, but
perhaps even make it obligatory for certain classes of public servants
to become farmers. We think that this will not only be good for the
development of agriculture, but that it will also help in the consolida54
tion of a stable and democratic community.

These programs have as yet required only minimal expenditure.
Since purchases of food absorb a large proportion of the incomes of
urban workers, increases in agricultural output, which should be
associated with falling prices, could lessen upward pressure on the
minimum wage. Resulting savings might, of course, be offset by
reduced revenue to the farmer. While betterment of rural conditions
would probably retard migration to the cities, the possibility of an
opposite impact should not be disregarded: that rural improvements
may stimulate migration to the cities by increasing levels of aspiration more rapidly than standards of living are raised is evident from
the impact of educational advances. Although recommendations that
additional schools be established in rural areas have been supported
by argument that such facilities will help to retain people on the
land,5 5 a leading demographic authority asserts:
supra note 50, at 4; Two-YEAat DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 22, at 23. See S.

La-Anyane & E. Afful, A Report on Guaranteed Prices for Maize, Sept. 26, 1966
(unpublished).
54 J. MENSAH, BUDGET STATEMENT FOR 1969-70, at 8 (1969). See id. at 6-8,
14-16; A. AFliFA, supra note 50, at 6-7; K. DIcxsoN, A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY Or
GHANA 225, 304 (1969); TwO-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 22, at 23, 66-68;

Feeders Forge Ahead, 1969 W. APR. 158; Ghana Viewed from Girton, 1970 W. AYR.
423.

55 K. Adjei, Occupational Choice and Organizational Selection: A Study of
Ghanaian Executives in the Civil Service, State Enterprises and Private ForeignOwned Corporations in Ghana, April 20, 1967, at 161 (unpublished dissertation in
New York University Library).
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The decision taken in Ghana to increase vastly over a small number of
years the amount of schooling being offered may well be necessary in
order to attain desired targets of social and economic modernisation;
but the corollary has inevitably been a very considerable boosting of
the population flow into the towns, which itself has helped to increase
urban unemployment. Whether the rise in educational levels can help
in the creation of a modern economy fast enough to absorb the migrants into urban occupations, or whether increasing urban unemployment will tend to stem the flow in spite of rising levels of schooling,
56
has yet to be seen.

D. Discrimination
The Lebano-Syrian community in Ghana comprised just over
2,000 persons in 1960 but has recently expanded rapidly. Many of
its members, residing primarily in Accra and other urban areas,
either were born in Ghana or have lived there much of their lives.
Nevertheless, they retain an expatriate status. Disturbed by the disproportionate economic success of this ethnic group, thought to have
been achieved in part at the expense of the indigenous population,
the Ghanaian government at the end of 1968 promulgated the
57
Ghanaian Enterprises Decree, elaborating and implementing a
5" requiring transfer of specified catepreviously announced policy
gories of firms from Levantine to local control. Section 11 of the
Decree provided:
[N]o person other than a Ghanaian shall operate or be concerned in
the operation of any of the following enterprises ... :(a) retail trade with an annual sales volume of five hundred thousand new cedis or less;
(b) wholesale trade with an annual sales volume of one million
new cedis or less;
(c) any taxi service;
(d) any business for the sale under hire-purchase contract of taxis
or vehicles to be used in the operation of a taxi service;
(e) any enterprise ... employing thirty persons or less which...
requires simple production or operational techniques or any
enterprise with a capital of one hundred thousand new cedis
or less, being:(i) an extractive, processing or manufacturing enterprise, or
(ii) an enterprise concerned with transportation of persons
or goods, or
(iii) an enterprise specified in an executive instrument by the
Government as being a small-scale enterprise; and
the representation in Ghana
(f) any enterprise concerned 5with
9
of overseas manufacturers.
56 THE MOVEMENT TO GHANA'S TowNs, supra note 3, at 85.

57 N.L.C.D. 323, Dec. 31, 1968, 7 National Liberation Council Decrees. See Legon
Observer, Jan. 17, 1969, at 1.
58 GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE PROMOTION

or GHANAIRN BusINEss ENTRRPRIsEs

(Ghana 1968).
59 Decree on Ghanaian Enterprises, BusmEsS WExLY, JAN. 6, 1969, at 5,
col. 1, at 6, col. 5.
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The recent Ghanaian Business (promotion) Act60 in general
continues or intensifies previous restraints. It directs relinquishment
of alien ownership in firms engaged in other forms of land transport
or the manufacture of cement blocks for sale as well as bakery,
printing, beauty culture, produce brokerage, and advertising and
publicity enterprises. A provision affecting with particular severity
expatriates from other African states prohibits petty trading by
nonnationals. Various circumventing actions are explicitly proscribed; unlawful conduct is to be punished by fines up to 2,000
cedis, imprisonment for up to two years, or both.
A recent official estimate placed the alien population of Ghana
at 2.5 million persons, perhaps 30 percent of all inhabitants.6 ' Although a reported additional claim that 75 percent of nonnationals
were under the age of fifteen casts doubt on the reliability of these
calculations, workers from other African states, attracted by a
higher standard of living, have played an important role in the
Ghanaian economy. 2 The government of Ghana has precipitously
responded to complaints of competition for employment and other
criticisms by Ghanaian citizens by ordering expulsion of aliens not
possessing residence permits." Although inevitably exaggerated by
the press, consequent dislocations appear substantial:
More than a quarter of the country's 8,000,000 inhabitants have been
ordered by the government to leave. They are Africans from other
countries ... who make their living mostly as small traders, unskilled
industrial workers, miners and farm laborers. Last week police began
arresting those without residence permits. Some 900,000 have already
fled back to their homelands. Hundreds of thousands more are waiting
to follow .... The big move began in December, after the government
of Prime Minister Kofi Busia announced that all aliens who lacked
residence permits would be expelled from Ghana within two weeks....
Busia's policy eventually may uproot all but 10% of Ghana's 2,500,000
aliens. The action may antagonize his neighbors, especially the Nigerians. But at home, where 600,000 Ghanaians are unemployed, the
move has already proved popular. Defending the mass expulsion, Busia
charged that 90% of Ghana's past and present prison population was
made up of aliens. It seemed a flimsy excuse for one of the greatest
forced population movements in black African history.64
60 Act 334, July 3, 1970, 6 ACTS OF GHANA.
61 Foreign Traders Purge, 1970 W. AFR. 55.
62 The lure of urban centers is reflected in a song of migrants from Upper
Volta:
"Qui n'a pas Itd d Kumasi, n'ira pas au Paradis." K. LIrTE, WEST AFRICAN URBANIZATION: A STUDY OF VOLUNTARY AsSOCIATIONS IN SOCIAL CHANGE
11 .(1965).
03 N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1969, at 14, col. 1; id., Dec. 10, 1969, at 13,
col. 1; id.,
Dec. 7, 1969, at 28, col. 1; id., Dec. 6, 1969, at 7, col. 1; id., Dec. 4, 1969, at 17,
col. 1.
64 Ghana: Exodus, TIME, Jan. 12, 1970,
at 22. See Ghana's Aliens: Reactions
in
Niger and Upper Volta, 1970 W. AzR. 519; Ghana: lbos and the Aliens Order,
1970
W. A mt. 146.
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These harsh discriminatory measures are perhaps predictable
responses to the Ghanaian dilemma. Unable to obtain resources sufficient to satisfy competing economic claims simultaneously, the
government has chosen to sacrifice the well-being of those it feels
no responsibility to represent. Its policy is the product of a decision,
not clearly unwarranted, that immediate loss to the community of
socially valuable skills will be more than offset by resulting benefits
to Ghanaians, especially urban Ghanaians. Loss to expatriates is
consciously excluded as an element of concern.
IV.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS

FROM EXPERIENCE

Professor Farer notes that in emerging nations the question in
developmental and other contexts is less often which policy is to5 be
implemented than whether any policy can be implemented. In
Ghana recent unsatisfactory economic performance appears due less
to administrative incompetence than to the nature of the problems
to which state power has been applied. The difficulties in Ghana
are in part a product of the dramatic decline in the world price of
cocoa in the first part of the last decade and the extravagance of
official expenditures in the years following 1957, when initial reserves of 500 million dollars were dissipated and external debts of
6
800 million dollars incurred. National misfortune has brought to
focus problems also present but not equally evident in other emerging nations whose economic structures have not yet been so severely
tested. The Ghanaian experience may therefore prove less an illustration of contemporary processes in other African states than an
indication of potential difficulties which can be mitigated by these
states through timely corrective action.
The dilemma of Ghanaian development can be explained in
terms of competing claims which jointly more than exhaust available resources. The model elaborated assumes a quadripartite division of such claims: resources required for investment necessary to
sustain growth are also sought for purposes of consumption by an
elite minority and the urban and rural laboring classes. None of
these claims can be disregarded with impunity, yet not all can be
Interven05 Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign
tion in Civil Strife, 82 HARv. L. REV. 511, 526 (1969).
of economic
66 Ghanaian government planners had sought to achieve a rate
1968 the
and
1963
Between
1969-70.
to
1963-64
growth of 5.5 percent per year from
percent annually,
real gross national product of Ghana increased an average of 1.3
Table 2
half as rapidly as its population. ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1968, supra note 23, at 18
NATIONAL RaFOR
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COMMISSION,
PLANNING
(1969); OFFICE OF THE
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CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 25 (1964); Bissue, Ghana's
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Plan in Retrospect, 11 GHANA EcoN. BuLL. 21 (1967). See Borders, Ghanaians

Drop Some Debts, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1970, at 4, col. 2.
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simultaneously satisfied. Voluntary abstinence by a politically powerful minority unconvinced that such behavior will yield private
benefit appears improbable. Nor can the proportion of national income distributed to an urban proletariat be sharply lowered without
greatly increased risk of insurrection. On the other hand, return
to marginal effort in a dispersed and hence politically less potent
agricultural sector can be driven below the productivity of this effort
without instantaneously disabling protest by those deprived of
greater gain. Similarly, devotion of a suboptimal share of national
income to the promotion of growth will seldom prove at once dramatically disruptive. The consequences of these choices, while probably otherwise at least as detrimental as those of any alternative
policy, are less immediate.
The difficulties which Ghana faces inhere in the process of
unregulated urbanization. Once established, a metropolitan proletariat can command a wage greatly exceeding its marginal productivity. Increasing numbers of migrants from rural areas are thus
attracted to the cities. Assimilation of these migrants will add to
the political power of the urban workers, permitting increased demands which when satisfied will stimulate further influx. Confrontation can be postponed both by burdening the rural population and
by reducing the rate of growth. These policies, however, only compound the dangers of the future by strengthening present sources of
disequilibrium. The Ghanaian example demonstrates the need for
enforced dispersion of industrial enterprise and detailed regulation
of urbanization at an early stage when such controls are politically
and economically practicable.

